



Reasoned proposal of new Directors' Remuneration Policy presented by the Board of Directors of Applus Services, S.A.

A new Remuneration Policy for the Directors of Applus Services, S.A. (the “**Company**”), prepared on the terms required under section 529 *novodecies* of the Spanish Companies Act (*Ley de Sociedades de Capital*) (the “**Remuneration Policy**”), is submitted for the approval of the shareholders at the General Meeting.

The Board of Directors has resolved to submit for the approval of the shareholders at the General Meeting the new Remuneration Policy, the text of which is included in the report received from the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, which the Board adopted on all its terms and which it attached to this reasoned proposal.

The main purpose of the proposed new Directors' Remuneration Policy is the amendment of the remuneration regime of the Chief Executive Officer of the Company and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), as well as certain terms of their contracts, in order to adapt them to the best market standards, requests from investors and shareholders and recommendations from proxy-advisors, based on the information and permanent dialogue maintained with them, as well as the assessment received from Mercer Consulting in this regard.

The remuneration of the directors in their capacity as such included in the proposed Remuneration Policy is consistent with the remuneration system established in article 25 of the By-laws and articles 25 and 27 of the Board of Directors Regulation. In addition, the remuneration for performance of executive duties that is also described in the proposed Remuneration Policy complies with the requirements provided by the Spanish Companies Act and with the principles and rules set forth in the Company's By-laws and the Board of Directors Regulation of the Company.

The Board likewise considers that the proposed Remuneration Policy is reasonably in proportion to the importance of the Company, is in line with the financial situation thereof and is consistent with market standards at comparable companies. Furthermore, the factors that affect the various components of remuneration for the performance of executive duties are compatible with an appropriate and effective management of risks, without offering the executive directors incentives to assume risks that exceed the level tolerated by the Company, which is also consistent with the Company's strategy, objectives, values and interests over the long term.

In Madrid, on 25 May 2022



Report issued by the Appointments and Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Applus Services, S.A. with regard to the proposed new Directors' Remuneration Policy of the Company

1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

The Appointments and Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Applus Services, S.A. (“**Applus**” or the “**Company**”) prepared this report on 25 May 2022, to provide a rationale and explanation for the proposed new Remuneration Policy for the Directors of the Company that is submitted to the Board of Directors, the full text of which is set forth in the Annex, in accordance with the provisions of article 529 novodecies of the Spanish Companies Act (*Ley de Sociedades de Capital*) and of article 39.3.b) of the Regulations of Applus’ Board of Directors.

It is expressly stated for the record that the proposed new Directors' Remuneration Policy must be submitted for the approval of the shareholders at the Company’s next General Shareholders’ Meeting. For these purposes, and in accordance with the provisions of articles 518 and 529 novodecies of the Spanish Companies Act, article 8 of the Regulations of Applus’ General Shareholders’ Meeting and article 25 of the Regulations of Applus’ Board of Directors, this report must be made available to the shareholders at the registered offices and published continuously on the Company’s website from the date of publication of the announcement of call to meeting until the holding of the aforementioned General Shareholders’ Meeting.

2. GENERAL RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSAL

The main purpose of the proposed new Directors' Remuneration Policy is the amendment of the remuneration regime of the Chief Executive Officer of the Company and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), as well as certain terms of their contracts, in order to adapt them to the best market standards, requests from investors and shareholders and recommendations from proxy-advisors, based on the information and permanent dialogue maintained with them, as well as the assessment received from Mercer Consulting in this regard.

The current Chief Executive Officer of the Company, Mr. Fernando Basabe, has announced his intention to retire and not to present himself for re-election as Director, as informed to the market by means of an insider information communication last 10 May 2022. As stated in said communication, the Board is progressing in the selection process to appoint Mr. Basabe's successor, however such process has not concluded yet and therefore no director's appointment will be proposed to the next General Shareholders' Meeting to replace him.

Consequently, at the moment when the Shareholders' Meeting will decide on this Remuneration Policy, the position of Chief Executive Officer will no longer exist in the Company. However, this Committee considers it convenient to maintain in this Remuneration Policy the description of the remuneration proposed for the chief executive of Applus, for the sake of full transparency for the shareholders and in the conviction that without such description, this Policy would be incomplete. However, the remuneration of the chief executive is proposed in terms of maximums, in order to provide the Company with the necessary

flexibility to negotiate the specific terms of such remuneration with the person to be elected for such position.

3. EXPLANATION OF THE MAIN AMENDMENTS IN THE NEW REMUNERATION POLICY

3.1. Fixed remuneration of the Executive Directors

The maximum fixed remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer shall be maintained at an amount of EUR 750,000.

The fixed remuneration of the Chief Financial Officer is increased to EUR 360,000, although from now on, he will renounce to receive the package of fixed RSUs that he had been receiving annually under the previous Remuneration Policy.

Benefits received as remuneration in kind (including pension plans) by the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer shall be increased up to a maximum cost equal to 15% of the annual fixed remuneration in cash of each.

3.2. Variable annual remuneration of Executive Directors

ESG targets are introduced in the variable annual remuneration of Executive Directors, resulting in: 55% on the adjusted operating profit —AOP—, 30% on the adjusted operating cash flow —AOCF— and 15% on four ESG targets.

In the case of the Chief Executive Officer, the variable base target amount established as a maximum amount of 80% of the fixed remuneration, is not modified.

As for the Chief Financial Officer, the variable base target amount is increased to 70% of the fixed remuneration. In addition, the maximum is set at 150% of the variable base target. Of the variable remuneration to be received, 62.5% would be paid in cash and the remaining 37.5% through the delivery of RSUs. The same policy applies in the case of members of Senior Management and the Chief Executive Officer.

The accelerated vesting clauses are completed and updated for the following cases: (i) *mortis causa*, (ii) permanent disability, (iii) good leaver or (iv) change of control.

If accredited inaccuracies in the information upon which the cash bonus and the RSUs were granted are reported, the Company shall be entitled, for a period of three years following the payment of the cash bonus and the RSUs, or the vesting of the RSUs, respectively, to claim the

refund of the amount of cash bonus and RSUs effectively received by each Executive Director because of those inaccuracies.

The possibility is introduced for the Board to increase the result of the mathematical calculation of the annual variable compensation of the Executive Directors in certain circumstances.

3.3. Long-term variable remuneration of Executive Directors

The targets of the long term incentive plan (which started in 2016 under the then applicable Remuneration Policy and entails the annual receipt of PSUs by the Executive Directors) have been reviewed and updated taken into consideration the strategic objectives and challenges set out in the 2022-2024 strategic plan (communicated last year), the feed-back gathered from investors and proxy-advisors and ESG commitments of Applus.

A target based on relative total shareholder return (TSR) is maintained. This parameter will represent 30% of the total PSUs.

A target regarding adjusted earnings per share reported by Applus (EPS) is maintained. This parameter will represent 50% of the total PSUs.

A target regarding the average return on capital employed (ROCE) is introduced. This parameter will represent 10% of the total PSUs granted each year.

A target regarding the achievement of four ESG targets within a three-year period is introduced. This parameter will represent 10% of the total PSUs granted each year.

The amount of the long term incentive for Executive Directors is increased. Each executive director will receive the following number of PSUs:

- The Chief Executive Officer will annually receive up to a maximum of PSUs equal to, in principle, 90% of his fixed remuneration.
- The Chief Financial Officer will annually receive PSUs equal to, in principle, 50% of his fixed remuneration.

The maximum number of PSUs to be vested shall be reduced to a maximum of 150% of the number of PSUs target.

The accelerated vesting conditions are updated and amended for the following events: (i) *mortis causa*, (ii) permanent disability, (iii) retirement, (iv) the participant's office or employment being with either a company which ceases to be a member of the Applus Group or relating to a business or part of a business which is transferred to a person or entity who is not a member of the Applus Group, or (v) any whatsoever termination carried out by the Company, except in the event of a disciplinary dismissal classified as fair by a court in a definitive judgement or not challenged by the Participant; then the Appointments and Compensation Committee shall determine the number of vested shares through the following steps: (a) the performance conditions will be considered to have been achieved at 100%; and

(b) applying a pro rata reduction to the number of shares determined based on the period of time after the grant date and ending on the date of cessation relative to the period of 3 years.

In addition, in the event of a change of control, all PSUs will be automatically vested in advance and will not be reduced in proportion to the time elapsed since the grant date and the performance conditions will be considered to have been achieved at 100%.

If accredited inaccuracies in the information upon which the PSUs were granted, the Company shall be entitled, for a period of three years following the payment of the PSUs, to claim the refund of the amount of PSUs which has been effectively received by each Executive Director because of those inaccuracies.

3.4. Main terms and conditions of the Executive Directors contracts

The essential terms and conditions of the Executive Directors' contracts are, apart from those relating to their remuneration, the following:

- (i) The Executive Directors' contracts are of indefinite term, but they can be terminated by any reason at any moment without any severance payment.
- (ii) Exclusivity while they perform executive duties.
- (iii) Termination: the Executive Directors' contracts may be terminated, at any moment, at the request of the corresponding executive director or the Company, provided that it is notified in writing to the other party and a six months' advance notice must be provided. The Executive Directors are not entitled to any compensation as a result of the termination of their contract, except for the provisions contained in the non-competition agreement.
- (iv) Post-contractual non-competition agreement: the Executive Directors shall not compete against the Company or any Applus Group company.

The non-competition commitment assumed by Executive Directors shall have a duration of two years following the termination of their respective contracts.

As consideration, upon such termination (whether at the request of the executive director or the Company), the Executive Director shall be entitled to receive an amount equal to the double of the fixed annual remuneration received in cash at the time of the termination of the contract, that will be paid for the 24-month period following such termination by means of 24 equal installments. The referred amount shall be reduced by the sum that, as the case may be, the Company would have to grant the executive director as legal compensation—which might result from the enforcement of the applicable law—for the termination of the contract, so that the total amount to be received by the executive director once the contract has been terminated does not

exceed, in any case, the double of the fixed remuneration that he received in the last year prior to the termination of the contract.

For the sake of clarity, Applus non-compete policies and strategy depends on the practice and legal regulations of the country where the Group operates and wishes to enforce the non-compete. Spanish law allows an enforceable two year non-compete if there is a fair and enough compensation for the manager, so the Board has decided and the executive managers have accepted to agree on the previous terms and conditions.

This non-compete agreement is binding for both parties, so neither the Company can waive the commitments to pay nor the Executive Director can compete and renounce to his right to be paid.

According to the terms of the previous agreements, the termination payments for Executive Directors comply with the Good Governance Code of Listed Companies in Spain, and protect the Group through an enforceable 2-years non-compete.

- (v) Shareholding retention: the Executive Directors will keep 1/3 of the net shares they receive per year, as the vesting of all RSUs and PSUs, until they achieve a number of shares which value (calculated with the share value at the date of the vesting) is equal to two times the net fixed salary. From that moment onwards, they will keep in shares at least two times their net fixed salary. That commitment will end in case of termination of their services to the Group or in case of change of control.
- (vi) Supplementary pension or early retirement systems: the Executive Directors shall not have supplementary pension or early retirement systems in place, but will be entitled to pension scheme contributions included in the total remuneration in kind as explained above.

4. CONCLUSION

In light of all the foregoing and in accordance with the provisions of section 529 novodecies of the Spanish Companies Act, Applus' Appointments and Remuneration Committee submits this proposal to the Company's Board of Directors so that it may in turn propose it for the approval of the shareholders at the General Shareholders' Meeting.

In Madrid, on 25 May 2022

ANNEX

Full text of the proposal

REMUNERATION POLICY OF THE DIRECTORS OF APPLUS SERVICES, S.A.

(hereinafter "**Applus**" or the "**Company**")

1. Duration of the policy

The Remuneration Policy will be in force during the present financial year 2022 and the following two years (2023 and 2024) unless an agreement amending or replacing such policy is passed by the General Shareholders' Meeting during its applicable period, in accordance with article 529 novodecies of the Spanish Companies Act.

2. Principles and grounds

The principles and grounds of the directors' Remuneration Policy of Applus, in their capacity as Board members and for the performance of executive duties, focus on a remuneration based on market practices, capable of attracting, retaining and motivating the necessary talent in accordance with the characteristics of its industry and of the countries in which the Company operates, in order to satisfy its business strategy and to meet shareholders' expectations.

Likewise, according to article 27.2 of the Board of Directors Regulation of the Company, independent directors shall be eligible for remuneration as a reward for the dedication, qualification and responsibility that the office demands, however, this remuneration should not reach a level which compromises their independence.

In any case, the directors' remuneration provided for in this Remuneration Policy will be reasonably proportionate to the importance of the Company, the economic situation and the market standards of comparable companies.

A significant portion of the remuneration of the Executive Directors is linked to the achievement of results that reflect the Group's strategic priorities. Long-term sustainability and Diversity are strategic priorities for Applus Board, so this Policy links the Executive Directors' annual bonus and long term incentive (LTI) to ESG targets, including diversity among them, and recognizes the commitment to maintain a minimum percentage of 40% female Directors already achieved in 2021. This Policy also links the Executive Directors' annual bonus with the adjusted operating profit and adjusted operating cash flow, therefore reflecting the strategic priorities for the Company relating to its operating profitability and cash flow generation. Moreover, this Policy also links the Executive Directors' LTI with the total shareholder return, earnings per share and return on capital employed, therefore reflecting the Company's long-term strategic priorities relative to sustainable shareholder value creation.

In setting the Remuneration Policy, the conditions of remuneration and employment of the Company's employees have been taken into account, specifically (i) since 2018, the CEO's

remuneration has not been increased, despite the fact that the remuneration of the Group's employees has been increasing in recent years; (ii) the structure and metrics of the annual variable remuneration system and the LTI of the Executive Directors is the same as that of the Group's employees; and (iii) the structure of benefits and pension plans is the same as that existing for the Company's executives in Spain.

Furthermore, the remuneration system is oriented towards the promotion, in the long-term, of the profitability, interests and sustainability of the Company and it incorporates the necessary cautions to avoid an excessive assumption of risks and the reward of unfavorable results.

Due to all of the reasons mentioned above, this Policy contributes to promote Applus' business strategy, long-term interests and sustainability.

This Policy has been prepared with the support of Mercer Consulting (UK & Spain) and approved by the Board of Directors after being submitted and informed by the Appointments and Compensation Committee.

3. Remuneration for non-executive directors, in their condition as such

The office of director of the Company is remunerated. In general, such remuneration comprises a fixed annual amount, as follows:

- (i) The amount of the annual remuneration payable by the Company to the Board of Directors as a whole, in their capacity as Board members (as fixed amount), was set by the General Shareholders' Meeting held on 30 May 2019 at EUR 1,500,000, and will remain in form until amended by the General Shareholders' Meeting.
- (ii) Unless otherwise determined by the General Shareholders' Meeting, the Board of Directors will determine the exact amount payable within the limit approved by the General Shareholders' Meeting, as well as the specific remuneration for each director, in his/her condition as Board member (as fixed amount), taking into account the functions and responsibilities attributed to each director, time commitment required and with reference to appropriate market conditions.

Notwithstanding the above, proprietary and executive directors shall not receive any remuneration for sitting on the Board of Directors or any other committee of the Board of Directors.

According to the above, for informative purposes, the Board has determined that the fixed annual remuneration for the Directors for 2022, in their capacity as Board members (as fixed amount) is:

- Compensation as Chairman of the Board: EUR 275,000.
- Compensation as Director (with the exception of the Chairman of the Board): EUR 66,000.
- Compensation as Head of a Committee: EUR 30,000.
- Compensation as member of a Committee: EUR 20,000.

In addition, directors will be reimbursed for travel, accommodation and any other expenses incurred due to attendance to Board of Directors and Committees meetings, as long as they are duly justified.

The Company has entered into a civil liability insurance policy for its directors on market conditions.

4. Executive Directors' remuneration for the performance of executive duties

As of this date, the “CEO” and the “CFO” are the only positions of the Board of Directors performing executive functions in the Company.

The proposal of compensation (fixed remuneration, annual bonus, benefits in kind and long term incentive) for the Executive Directors in this Policy have been analyzed by the Appointments and Compensation Committee and approved by the Board of Directors, based on a salary benchmark for their positions provided by Mercer Consulting.

4.1 Fixed remuneration

The fixed remuneration to be paid to the CEO amounts up to a maximum of EUR 750,000.

Furthermore, the CEO of the Company shall receive other benefits as remuneration in kind, at a maximum cost equal to 15% of the fixed remuneration in cash. This percentage of the base salary as remuneration in kind is in line with the policy in place for Senior Managers. In addition, the Company will annually contribute to the CEO's pension scheme an amount equal to the difference between the referred 15% of the fixed remuneration and the cost of the actual benefits received by the CEO in said year. The executive director will decide every year the amount to be used for each benefit, keeping always the maximum cost equal to 15% of the fixed remuneration in cash

The CEO can also decide every year if he wants a reduction in his fixed salary to have this same amount invested in a pension scheme, an option also available for Senior Managers.

The fixed remuneration of the CFO amounts to EUR 360,000.

Furthermore, the CFO of the Company shall receive other benefits as remuneration in kind, at a maximum cost equal to 15% of the fixed remuneration in cash, which may among other items include a pension scheme contribution at the discretion of the director. This percentage of the base salary as remuneration in kind is in line with the policy in place for Senior Managers.

The executive director will decide every year the amount to be used for each benefit, keeping always the maximum cost equal to 15% of the fixed remuneration in cash

The CFO can also decide every year if he wants a reduction in his fixed salary to have this same amount invested in a pension scheme, an option also available for Senior Managers.

For the sake of clarity, Applus does not have a corporate pension plan, and the policy regarding this benefit is based on the practice of each of the countries / business. The pension plan policy for executive directors is aligned with the company practice for managers in Spain, where the executive directors are located.

During the term of this Remuneration Policy, the annual fixed remuneration amount for the executive directors will be increased with reference to the Consumer Price Index in Spain or any other index which may substitute it in the future, unless the Board of Directors decides not to apply this increase.

4.2 Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration for the executive directors comprises: (i) a variable annual amount both in cash and by means of the delivery of RSUs, linked to achieving targets; and (ii) a long term incentive plan, payable by means of the award of *performance stock units* (“PSUs”) and also linked to achieving targets.

- (i) The executive directors’ variable annual remuneration will be linked to achieving targets (55% based on the Group’s adjusted operating profit – AOP – and 30% based on its adjusted operating cash flow – AOCF – and 15% based on four ESG targets).

The AOP and AOCF targets will be disclosed *ex post* annually at the Annual Report on the Remuneration of the Directors to avoid sharing in advance strategic confidential information.

The ESG targets will be disclosed every year in February after being approved by the Board of Directors. This year 2022 this information has been released with this Policy.

The AOP, AOCF and ESG results will be disclosed *ex post* annually at the Annual Report on the Remuneration of the Directors to avoid sharing in advance strategic confidential information.

The amount of this remuneration item will be calculated as follows:

For the CEO:

- ✓ the variable base target amount, which is established up to a maximum of 80% of the fixed remuneration, will be increased by 2% for every increment of 1% achieved in excess of the targets, up to a maximum of 150% of the variable base target (however each target can achieve a 200% payout). On the other hand, the variable remuneration will be reduced by 5% for every decrease of 1% on the targets. Same policy as for Senior Managers.
- ✓ 62.5% of the variable remuneration to be received shall be paid in cash and the remaining 37.5% through the delivery of RSUs. Same policy as for Senior Managers.

For the CFO:

- ✓ the variable base target amount, which is established as 70% of the fixed remuneration, will be increased by 2% for each increment of 1% achieved in excess of the targets, up to a maximum of 150% of the variable base target (however each target can achieve a 200% payout). On the other hand, the

variable remuneration will be reduced by 5% for every decrease of 1% on the targets. Same policy as for Senior Managers.

- ✓ 62.5% % of the variable remuneration to be received shall be paid in cash and the remaining 37.5% through the delivery of RSUs. Same policy as for Senior Managers.

The basis for the calculation of the RSUs to be delivered to each executive director will be the average market value of Applus shares during the 60-day period prior to the date of grant of the RSUs.

The RSUs will be delivered every year on the date of approval by the Board of Directors of Applus' annual results and the amount of each executive director's annual variable remuneration.

Each RSU will vest into one share, and 30%, 30%, and 40% of the RSUs will vest after one, two and three years from the date they were delivered, respectively, subject to continuous employment on the vesting date.

If the termination of the Participant's service is due to any of the following events: (i) *mortis causa*, (ii) permanent disability, (iii) good leaver (understanding as such the event of (a) retirement; (b) the Participant's office or employment being with either a company which ceases to be a member of the Applus Group or relating to a business or part of a business which is transferred to a person who is not a member of the Applus Group; and (c) any whatsoever termination carried out by the Company except in the event of a disciplinary dismissal classified as fair by a court in a definitive judgement or not challenged by the Participant; or (iv) change of control (understanding as such the event of (i) a merger, consolidation, acquisition or other transaction as a result of which securities possessing more than 50% of the total combined voting power of the Company's outstanding securities are transferred to a person or persons different from the persons holding those securities immediately prior to such transaction; (ii) the sale, transfer or other disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's assets in complete liquidation or dissolution of the Company; or (iii) the acquisition by a third party (individual or legal entity), either individually or jointly with others which act in a coordinated way, of a control stake of the Company in accordance with what is set forth in article 4 of Royal Decree 1066/2007, 27 July, on the initial public offerings regime as amended from time to time), then all RSUs granted pursuant to the RSU plan that have not vested on the date the event takes effect shall be automatically vested on the date the event takes effect. The settlement of the vested RSUs in the event of a change of control will be paid in cash on the date of the change of control event.

If accredited inaccuracies in the information upon which the cash bonus and the RSUs were granted are reported by an accredited auditor and approved by the Board of Directors, the Company shall be entitled, for a period of three years following the payment of the cash bonus and the RSUs, or the vesting of the RSUs, respectively, to claim the refund of the net (of any withholding taxes or fees) amount of cash bonus, net amount of RSUs, and net amount of shares pursuant to a vesting of RSUs, as applicable, which has been effectively received by each executive director because of those inaccuracies.

The Board of Directors, prior a favorable proposal from the Appointments and Compensation Committee, may increase the result of the mathematical calculation of the annual variable compensation of the Executive Directors if (i) it is duly justified, (ii) the increase will be for a maximum amount of 50% of the target base (in cash and RSUs), and (iii) the final total amount of the annual variable compensation, after the increase if any, will not exceed the target base (in cash and RSUs). This decision shall be made public *ex post* annually at the Annual Report on the Remuneration of the Directors the Annual Compensation Report.

- (ii) The long term incentive plan (which started in 2016 under the then applicable Remuneration Policy) involves the annual receipt of PSUs by the executive directors, each one exchangeable for one share of the Company in accordance with the vesting schedule referred to below.

The long term incentive plan targets have been reviewed and updated taking into consideration the strategic objectives and challenges in 2022-2024 strategic plan (communicated last year), the feed-back gathered from investors and proxy-advisors and the ESG commitments of Applus.

The amount of the long term incentive for executive directors has also been updated after the Mercer Consulting compensation report, taking into consideration the salary benchmark, the need to retain and motivate the executive directors and the new strategic targets added into the incentive.

The targets of the long term incentive for the executive directors are the same targets of the managers who are also entitled to this incentive.

Each executive director will receive the following number of PSUs:

- The CEO will annually receive up to a maximum of PSUs equal to, in principle, 90 % of his fixed remuneration.
- The CFO will annually receive PSUs equal to, in principle, 50 % of his fixed remuneration.

However, depending on the degree of achievement of the parameters set forth below, such amounts may finally fluctuate as set forth below. The number of PSUs that will be vested will have a value between 0% and 150% of the number of PSUs target, depending on the degree of compliance with the targets. However, each target of the LTI can achieve a value between 0% and 200% payout.

The value of each PSU will be equivalent to the average quote value of a share in the Company during the sixty days prior to the granting of the PSUs.

The PSUs will be granted every year on the date of approval by the Board of Directors of Applus' annual results. The number of PSUs to be delivered to the executive directors may be adjusted over the course of the year if his fixed remuneration is modified. Notwithstanding the latter, the day of delivery of the additional PSUs shall be considered as the date of approval of the corresponding annual results.

The PSUs awarded in each year shall be vested into shares within a three-year period as from the day they were awarded provided that certain parameters, as set out below, are met. The number of PSUs that will be vested will have a value between 0% and 135% of the fixed remuneration of the CEO, if he were awarded with the maximum number of PSUs target equal to 90% of the fixed remuneration) and between 0% and 75% of the fixed remuneration of the CFO, depending on the degree of compliance with such parameters during the three years prior to the vesting, so as to ensure that the vesting reflects the professional performance of the executive directors during each three-year period.

In particular, the vesting of PSUs will be based on the following quantitative parameters:

- a) A target based on relative total shareholder return (“**TSR**”) within a three-year period, where the Company’s TSR will be compared with an unweighted index composed of a group of eight peer companies within the testing, inspection and certification industry (SGS, Bureau Veritas, Intertek, Eurofins Scientific, Core Laboratories, ALS, Team Industrial Services, Mistras).

The Board of Directors can modify the group of companies to be used for a LTI, if the changes are decided and disclosed before the LTI award.

The index is the result of calculating the annualized TSR of the media TSR of the eight peer companies.

This parameter will represent 30% of the total PSUs granted each year.

In particular, within this 30%, 50% of PSUs will be vested should the Applus annualized TSR performance be equal to the index and 200% of PSUs will be vested should the Applus annualized TSR performance be 5% greater on an annual cumulative basis than the index. Between the index and the TSR value that gives right to vest 200% of PSUs, there will be a straight line vesting between such two values. As a result, 100% of PSUs will be vested should the Applus annualized TSR performance be 1.67% greater than the index.

If the TSR performance is below the index, no PSUs will vest for this parameter. The maximum number of PSUs that will be vested will be 200% of the target PSUs.

The evaluation of the TSR is done by an external firm which submits a report to the Appointments and Compensation Committee. Every year the name of this firm will be disclosed at the Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors. Since 2016 until 2021, the firm responsible for this report has been PWC.

- b) A target regarding adjusted earnings per share (“**EPS**”) accumulated within a three-year period.

This parameter will represent 50% of the total PSUs granted each year.

The Board of Directors will set specific thresholds for this EPS target at which PSUs will be vested. The maximum number of PSUs that will be vested will be 200% of the target PSUs.

If the EPS performance is below the specific threshold that gives right to vest 50% PSUs, no PSUs will vest for this parameter.

- c) A target regarding the average Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) of the three-year period.

This parameter will represent 10% of the total PSUs granted each year.

The Board of Directors will set specific thresholds for this ROCE target at which PSUs will be vested. The maximum number of PSUs that will be vested will be 200% of the target PSUs.

If the ROCE performance is below the specific threshold that gives right to vest 50% PSUs, no PSUs will vest for this parameter.

- d) A target regarding four ESG targets to be achieved in the three-year period.

This parameter will represent 10% of the total PSUs granted each year.

The maximum number of PSUs that will be vested will be 200% of the target PSUs. If the performance is below the specific threshold that gives right to vest 50% PSUs, no PSUs will vest for this parameter.

ESG targets and results are calculated considering perimeter at January 1 of the first year of each three-year period. Acquisitions will not be included. However, we are committed to implement our Group policies in the new acquisitions, so they will be included in the target/metrics for the following strategic plan.

The ESG targets, the EPS targets and the ROCE targets will be disclosed *ex post* in the Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors. However, the EPS and ROCE targets for the LTI 2022 – 2024 are the ones already communicated with the strategic plan and they have been disclosed with this Policy, with the ESG targets 2022 – 2024.

The evaluation of all targets of the LTI will be included in the Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors.

If the Participant ceases in his contractual link with the Group by reason of any of the following events: (i) *mortis causa*; (ii) permanent disability; (iii) retirement; (iv) the Participant's office or employment being with either a company which ceases to be a member of the Applus Group or relating to a business or part of a business which is transferred to a person who is not a member of the Applus Group; (v) any whatsoever termination carried out by the Company except in the event of a disciplinary dismissal classified as fair by a court in a definitive judgement or not challenged by the Participant; then the Appointments and Compensation Committee shall determine the number of vested shares through the following steps: (a) the performance conditions

will be considered to have been achieved at 100%; and (b) applying a pro rata reduction to the number of shares determined based on the period of time after the grant date and ending on the date of cessation relative to the period of 3 years.

Moreover, in the event of a change of control (understanding as such the event of (i) a merger, consolidation, acquisition or other transaction as a result of which securities possessing more than 50% of the total combined voting power of the Company's outstanding securities are transferred to a person or persons different from the persons holding those securities immediately prior to such transaction; (ii) the sale, transfer or other disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's assets in complete liquidation or dissolution of the Company; or (iii) the acquisition by a third party (individual or legal entity), either individually or jointly with others which act in a coordinated way, of a control stake of the Company in accordance with what is set forth in article 4 of Royal Decree 1066/2007, 27 July, on the initial public offerings regime as amended from time to time), then the Appointments and Compensation Committee shall notify the Participant as soon as practicable from becoming aware of that event or a proposed event that all PSUs will be automatically vested on the date of such event, if they had not been vested yet. The settlement of the vested PSUs in the event of a change of control will be paid in cash on the date of the change of control event.

PSUs to be vested will not be reduced in any proportion to the time elapsed since the grant date, and the performance conditions will be considered to have been achieved at 100%. If the Participant ceases to be a director or employee of the Group concurrently with a change of control event, then the change of control rule shall prevail.

If accredited inaccuracies in the information upon which the PSUs or the shares pursuant to a vesting of PSUs were granted are reported by an accredited auditor and approved by the Board of Directors, the Company shall be entitled, for a period of three years following the payment of the PSUs or the vesting of the PSUs, respectively, to claim the refund of the net (of any withholding taxes or fees) amount of PSUs and net amount of shares pursuant to a vesting of PSUs, as applicable, which has been effectively received by each executive director because of those inaccuracies.

4.3 Main terms and conditions of the executive director's contract

The essential terms and conditions of the executive directors' contracts are, apart from those relating to their remuneration, the following:

- (i) **Duration:** the executive directors' contracts are of indefinite term, but they can be terminated by any reason at any moment without any severance payment. The reason for this is that the legal amount to be paid for termination, if any, will be discounted from the non-compete payment keeping this agreement fully enforceable. This clause has been agreed in the non-compete provisions between the company and the executive directors.
- (ii) **Exclusivity:** while they perform executive duties, the executive directors may not hold any direct or indirect interest in any other business or activity which may represent a conflict of interests in relation to the Company's obligations and liabilities or in relation to its activity and that of the Applus Group.

- (iii) Termination: the executive directors' contracts may be terminated, at any moment, at the request of the corresponding executive director or the Company, provided that it is notified in writing to the other party. Six months' advance notice must be provided. If one of the executive directors or the Company fully or partially breaches the advance notice obligation, the other party would be entitled to an indemnity equal to the fixed remuneration of the relevant executive director relating to the duration of the breached advance notice period.

The executive directors are not entitled to any compensation as a result of the termination of their contract, except for the provisions contained in the non-competition agreement.

- (iv) Post-contractual non-competition agreement: the executive directors shall not compete against the Company or any Applus Group company.

The non-competition commitment assumed by executive directors shall have a duration of two years following the termination of his contract. Competition shall be understood as the provision of any kind of services, on his own behalf or on behalf of a third party, whether it entails executive duties or mere advisory duties, or the direct or indirect promotion of the incorporation of companies and entities that will develop a competing business, as well as equity stake in these companies or entities. For these purposes, a competing business shall be deemed as any activity that, at the time of termination of the executive director's contract, is being developed by any company belonging to the Applus Group in a certain territory or it is scheduled to start being developed in a certain territory within the 12 months following the termination of the executive director's contract. Likewise, the executive director will not recruit or participate in the recruitment (for himself or for the entity which he represents or in which he performs his activities) of employees who, at the date of termination of his contract or in the preceding twelve months, form part or have formed part of the Applus Group's workforce.

As consideration, upon such termination (whether at the request of the executive director's or the Company), the executive director's shall be entitled to receive an amount equal to the double of the fixed annual remuneration received in cash at the time of the termination of the contract, that will be paid for the 24-month period following such termination by means of 24 equal installments. The referred amount shall be reduced by the sum that, as the case may be, the Company would have to grant the executive director as legal compensation—which might result from the enforcement of the applicable law—for the termination of the contract, so that the total amount to be received by the executive director once the contract has been terminated does not exceed, in any case, the double of the fixed remuneration that he received in the last year prior to the termination of the contract.

Should the executive director breach this commitment and compete with the Company or any company within the Applus Group, he shall return the amounts paid by the Company as compensation for this non-compete agreement.

For the sake of clarity, Applus non-compete policies and strategy depends on the practice and legal regulations of the country where the Group operates and wish to

enforce the non-compete. Spanish law allows an enforceable two year non-compete if there is a fair and enough compensation for the manager, so the Board has decided and the executives managers accepted to agree on the previous terms and conditions.

This non-compete agreement is binding, so neither the company can waive the commitments to pay nor the executive director can compete and renounce to his right to be paid.

According to the terms of the previous agreements, the termination payments for executive directors comply with the Good Governance Code of Listed Companies in Spain and protect the Group through an enforceable 2-years non-compete.

- (v) Shareholding retention: the executive directors will keep 1/3 of the net shares they receive per year, as the vesting of all RSUs and PSUs, until they achieve a number of shares which value (calculated with the share value at the date of the vesting) is equal to two times the net fixed salary. From that moment onwards, they will keep in shares at least two times the net fixed salary. That commitment will end in case of termination of their service to the Group or in case of change of control.
- (vi) Supplementary pension or early retirement systems: the executive directors shall not have supplementary pension or early retirement systems in place, but will be entitled to pension scheme contributions by the Company in the terms described in section 4.1.